{"id":2164,"date":"2026-07-22T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-07-22T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ic-services.io\/?p=2164"},"modified":"2026-10-21T14:13:28","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T13:13:28","slug":"por-ejemplo-la-interceptacion-legal-etc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ic-services.io\/es\/resources\/blog\/esim-lawful-interception-rsp\/","title":{"rendered":"eSIM e interceptaci\u00f3n legal: Qu\u00e9 significa la arquitectura RSP para el cumplimiento de la normativa"},"content":{"rendered":"

La interceptaci\u00f3n legal de las eSIM plantea retos t\u00e9cnicos \u00fanicos en comparaci\u00f3n con la interceptaci\u00f3n tradicional basada en tarjetas SIM. La transici\u00f3n de las tarjetas SIM f\u00edsicas a la tecnolog\u00eda de SIM integrada (eSIM) est\u00e1 transformando el panorama de las telecomunicaciones m\u00f3viles. Impulsada por la arquitectura de aprovisionamiento remoto de SIM (RSP) de la GSMA, la eSIM permite a los abonados cambiar de operador, activar perfiles y gestionar m\u00faltiples suscripciones sin necesidad de sustituir f\u00edsicamente una tarjeta SIM. Para los consumidores, esto supone una mayor flexibilidad y comodidad. Para los operadores \u2014y, en particular, para los responsables de cumplimiento de la normativa sobre interceptaci\u00f3n legal<\/a> \u2014 La eSIM plantea nuevas complejidades que hay que comprender y abordar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Este art\u00edculo analiza c\u00f3mo la arquitectura RSP afecta a la interceptaci\u00f3n legal, identifica los retos espec\u00edficos que plantea la eSIM para la identificaci\u00f3n de objetivos y la gesti\u00f3n de la interceptaci\u00f3n, y ofrece orientaci\u00f3n pr\u00e1ctica a los operadores que deseen mantener el cumplimiento normativo en un entorno compatible con la eSIM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

C\u00f3mo funciona la interceptaci\u00f3n legal de la eSIM<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The GSMA RSP architecture defines the ecosystem for managing eSIM profiles. The key components include the Subscription Manager \u2014 Data Preparation (SM-DP+), which prepares and securely delivers operator profiles to eSIM devices; the Subscription Manager \u2014 Discovery Server (SM-DS), which facilitates the discovery of available profiles; the eUICC (embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which is the secure element within the device that hosts one or more operator profiles; and the Local Profile Assistant (LPA), which is the software on the device that manages profile download, installation, and switching. For IoT devices, GSMA SGP.31\/SGP.32 replaces the user-driven LPA with a remote eSIM IoT Manager (eIM).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the RSP model, an operator’s profile \u2014 containing the IMSI, authentication credentials, network access configuration, and other parameters \u2014 is downloaded and installed onto the eUICC remotely. Multiple profiles can coexist on a single eUICC. Older eUICCs allow only one enabled profile at a time; since GSMA SGP.22 v3, devices supporting Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP) can run two at once. Subscribers can switch between profiles \u2014 and effectively between operators \u2014 through a software operation on the device, without any physical intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This dynamic, software-driven provisioning model is fundamentally different from the traditional physical SIM model, where the IMSI is personalised onto a card that has to be physically delivered. The implications for lawful interception are significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Retos en la identificaci\u00f3n de objetivos<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Las \u00f3rdenes de interceptaci\u00f3n legal suelen identificar al destinatario mediante uno o varios identificadores: MSISDN (n\u00famero de tel\u00e9fono), IMSI (identidad del abonado), IMEI (identidad del dispositivo) o direcci\u00f3n IP. El modelo eSIM complica cada uno de estos m\u00e9todos de identificaci\u00f3n de diferentes maneras.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

MSISDN-based targeting is affected by the ease with which subscribers can change operators \u2014 and by extension change their MSISDN \u2014 through a simple profile switch. A target who suspects surveillance may switch to a different profile and MSISDN without a physical SIM changing hands. Similar switches have always been possible with dual-SIM phones. Each new profile still means a new subscription (in Germany, prepaid profiles require an identity check before activation, \u00a7 172(2) TKG), and its download is logged against the device’s EID. The operator that was performing the interception may lose visibility of the target entirely if the target activates a profile from a different operator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La localizaci\u00f3n basada en el IMSI se enfrenta a retos similares. Cada perfil de operador de la eUICC tiene su propio IMSI. Cuando el usuario cambia de perfil, se activa un IMSI diferente y el IMSI original deja de ser visible en la red. El operador que est\u00e9 realizando la interceptaci\u00f3n bas\u00e1ndose en el IMSI original ver\u00e1 c\u00f3mo el usuario parece desaparecer de la red.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IMEI-based targeting is more stable in the eSIM context, as the IMEI is associated with the device rather than the SIM profile. Note that dual-SIM and multi-profile devices carry a separate IMEI for each simultaneously active subscription, and that the network usually learns the IMEI only at registration. However, IMEI-based interception has its own limitations \u2014 it may capture communications from other users who share the device, and it does not help if the target uses multiple devices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La segmentaci\u00f3n basada en direcciones IP es, por naturaleza, din\u00e1mica y no se ve afectada espec\u00edficamente por la eSIM; sin embargo, la complejidad general de la segmentaci\u00f3n en un entorno de eSIM puede llevar a las fuerzas del orden a recurrir en mayor medida a la identificaci\u00f3n basada en direcciones IP, lo que plantea sus propios retos en cuanto a la asignaci\u00f3n din\u00e1mica y la traducci\u00f3n de direcciones de red.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cambio de perfil y continuidad de la interceptaci\u00f3n<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

One of the most significant challenges that eSIM creates for lawful interception is the potential for interception discontinuity during profile switches. When a target switches from one operator profile to another on the same device, the interception that was active on the first operator’s network must be coordinated with a new interception on the second operator’s network. In practice, law enforcement must identify the new operator, obtain a new order and serve it there, which may take hours or days, during which the target’s communications go unmonitored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The speed and ease of profile switching in the eSIM model \u2014 which can be accomplished in seconds on many devices \u2014 contrasts sharply with the time required to establish a new interception on a different operator’s network. This temporal gap is an investigative challenge for law enforcement rather than a compliance gap for the original operator, whose obligation ends at its own subscription and the identifiers named in the order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Addressing this challenge requires enhanced coordination mechanisms between operators and law enforcement, potentially including automated notifications when a target’s profile is deactivated and standardised procedures for rapidly establishing interceptions on the target’s new operator. Standardised solutions are not yet widely available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Escenarios con m\u00faltiples perfiles y dispositivos<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

La tecnolog\u00eda eSIM permite situaciones que resultan dif\u00edciles de abordar con los m\u00e9todos de interceptaci\u00f3n tradicionales. Un mismo dispositivo puede albergar varios perfiles de operador, potencialmente de operadores de diferentes pa\u00edses. Un mismo abonado puede tener perfiles de eSIM en varios dispositivos: un smartphone, una tableta, un reloj inteligente y un ordenador port\u00e1til. Cada combinaci\u00f3n de perfil y dispositivo crea un canal de comunicaci\u00f3n potencial que podr\u00eda ser necesario interceptar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For operators, this means that the scope of an interception may extend beyond the traditional single-subscriber, single-device model. Within its own customer base, the operator should be able to tell law enforcement which other subscriptions or eSIM profiles the same customer holds, so that the order can be extended. It can intercept only the identifiers the order names.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Para las fuerzas del orden, el modelo de perfiles m\u00faltiples implica que una \u00fanica orden de interceptaci\u00f3n puede no ser suficiente. Si el sujeto de la investigaci\u00f3n tiene perfiles en las redes de varios operadores, puede ser necesario emitir \u00f3rdenes separadas para cada operador. La coordinaci\u00f3n de estas m\u00faltiples \u00f3rdenes \u2014garantizando una cobertura completa sin lagunas\u2014 a\u00f1ade complejidad al proceso de investigaci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Repercusiones para el sistema LI<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To maintain effective lawful interception in an eSIM environment, operators must ensure that their LI systems address several specific requirements. First, operators should understand what the network actually sees. Switching profiles happens locally on the device. The operator’s network sees it the way it sees a phone being switched off: the target’s subscription deregisters, and the existing interception reports this as IRI. The SM-DP+ is not a real-time LI source. Its value is in the records it keeps, such as which EID a profile was downloaded to, which can support disclosure requests. The LI system should not push target data to the SM-DP+, which is often operated by a third party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, the LI system must support the correlation of multiple identifiers associated with the same subscriber. A target may be known by different MSISDNs, IMSIs, and IP addresses depending on which profile is active. The LI system must maintain a mapping between these identifiers and the target’s interception order, ensuring that every identifier named in the order (MSISDN, IMSI\/SUPI, IMEI\/PEI) is intercepted, and that law enforcement can quickly learn which further identifiers the same customer uses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, the LI system should deliver the standard registration and deregistration events promptly, since a profile switch shows up on the network as the target’s subscription deregistering. This information can be valuable to law enforcement in understanding the target’s behavior and in deciding on follow-up orders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

En cuarto lugar, el operador\u2026 gesti\u00f3n de \u00f3rdenes de detenci\u00f3n<\/a> system must be capable of handling the additional complexity introduced by eSIM. This includes the ability to modify interception parameters when the order is amended, to report promptly when a target’s subscription goes inactive, so that law enforcement can decide on follow-up orders, and to keep a complete audit trail of every order amendment, identifier change and task activation or deactivation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Evoluci\u00f3n de la normativa y las normas<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

LI standards address the issue indirectly: identifiers are always tied to the subscription or device, not to the SIM form factor. 3GPP’s 5G LI architecture (TS 33.127\/33.128) is SIM-agnostic: it intercepts by SUPI, PEI and GPSI, whether the credentials sit on a physical SIM or an eSIM profile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

National LI rules<\/a> generally do not treat eSIM separately. In Germany, the TK\u00dcV and TR TK\u00dcV are technology-neutral: interception is tied to identifiers such as MSISDN, IMSI\/SUPI and IMEI\/PEI, so it applies to eSIM subscriptions exactly as to physical SIMs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusi\u00f3n<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

eSIM technology and the RSP architecture introduce significant new challenges for lawful interception, primarily related to target identification, interception continuity, and multi-profile scenarios. These challenges are not insurmountable, but they require operators to report registration events promptly, keep reliable records linking EID, ICCID and IMSI, and answer subscriber-data requests quickly. eSIM does not change an operator\u2019s LI obligations; it changes how quickly law enforcement needs to learn about a target\u2019s other subscriptions.<\/p>\n\n\n

Medidas pr\u00e1cticas para los operadores<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Operators should begin by assessing their current eSIM deployment and its impact on their existing LI capabilities. This assessment should identify any gaps in target identification, interception continuity, or multi-profile handling. Based on the assessment, operators should develop a roadmap for enhancing their LI systems to address eSIM-specific challenges, prioritising the highest-risk gaps first. Prompt delivery of registration and deregistration events, and the ability to answer subscriber-data requests from the operator’s own EID, ICCID and IMSI records, are the foundation for supporting law enforcement in an eSIM environment. Operators should also engage with their national regulatory authority to understand any specific guidance or requirements related to eSIM and LI compliance, and should participate in industry forums and standards development activities to help shape the emerging solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A medida que se acelera la adopci\u00f3n de las eSIM, los retos relacionados con la interceptaci\u00f3n legal de las eSIM cobrar\u00e1n mayor relevancia. Los operadores deber\u00edan abordar de forma proactiva los requisitos de interceptaci\u00f3n legal de las eSIM en sus planes de cumplimiento normativo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Art\u00edculos relacionados<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Si desea leer m\u00e1s sobre temas relacionados, consulte estos art\u00edculos:<\/p>\n\n\n\n