{"id":2164,"date":"2026-07-22T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-07-22T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ic-services.io\/?p=2164"},"modified":"2026-10-21T14:13:28","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T13:13:28","slug":"par-exemple-linterception-legale-etc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ic-services.io\/fr\/resources\/blog\/esim-lawful-interception-rsp\/","title":{"rendered":"eSIM et interception l\u00e9gale : Ce que l'architecture RSP signifie pour la conformit\u00e9"},"content":{"rendered":"

L'interception l\u00e9gale des eSIM pose des d\u00e9fis techniques particuliers par rapport \u00e0 l'interception traditionnelle bas\u00e9e sur les cartes SIM. Le passage des cartes SIM physiques \u00e0 la technologie des cartes SIM int\u00e9gr\u00e9es (eSIM) est en train de transformer le paysage des t\u00e9l\u00e9communications mobiles. S'appuyant sur l'architecture RSP (Remote SIM Provisioning) de la GSMA, l'eSIM permet aux abonn\u00e9s de changer d'op\u00e9rateur, d'activer des profils et de g\u00e9rer plusieurs abonnements sans avoir \u00e0 remplacer physiquement une carte SIM. Pour les consommateurs, cela se traduit par davantage de flexibilit\u00e9 et de confort. Pour les op\u00e9rateurs \u2014 et en particulier pour les responsables de conformit\u00e9 aux dispositions relatives \u00e0 l'interception l\u00e9gale<\/a> \u2014 L'eSIM introduit de nouvelles complexit\u00e9s qu'il faut comprendre et prendre en compte.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cet article examine l'impact de l'architecture RSP sur l'interception l\u00e9gale, identifie les d\u00e9fis sp\u00e9cifiques que pose l'eSIM en mati\u00e8re d'identification des cibles et de gestion des interceptions, et fournit des conseils pratiques aux op\u00e9rateurs souhaitant rester en conformit\u00e9 dans un environnement utilisant la technologie eSIM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Comment fonctionne l'interception l\u00e9gale via l'eSIM ?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The GSMA RSP architecture defines the ecosystem for managing eSIM profiles. The key components include the Subscription Manager \u2014 Data Preparation (SM-DP+), which prepares and securely delivers operator profiles to eSIM devices; the Subscription Manager \u2014 Discovery Server (SM-DS), which facilitates the discovery of available profiles; the eUICC (embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which is the secure element within the device that hosts one or more operator profiles; and the Local Profile Assistant (LPA), which is the software on the device that manages profile download, installation, and switching. For IoT devices, GSMA SGP.31\/SGP.32 replaces the user-driven LPA with a remote eSIM IoT Manager (eIM).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the RSP model, an operator’s profile \u2014 containing the IMSI, authentication credentials, network access configuration, and other parameters \u2014 is downloaded and installed onto the eUICC remotely. Multiple profiles can coexist on a single eUICC. Older eUICCs allow only one enabled profile at a time; since GSMA SGP.22 v3, devices supporting Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP) can run two at once. Subscribers can switch between profiles \u2014 and effectively between operators \u2014 through a software operation on the device, without any physical intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This dynamic, software-driven provisioning model is fundamentally different from the traditional physical SIM model, where the IMSI is personalised onto a card that has to be physically delivered. The implications for lawful interception are significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Les d\u00e9fis li\u00e9s \u00e0 l'identification des cibles<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Les mandats d'interception l\u00e9gale identifient g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement la cible \u00e0 l'aide d'un ou plusieurs identifiants : MSISDN (num\u00e9ro de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone), IMSI (identifiant d'abonn\u00e9), IMEI (identifiant de l'appareil) ou adresse IP. Le mod\u00e8le eSIM complique chacune de ces m\u00e9thodes d'identification de diff\u00e9rentes mani\u00e8res.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

MSISDN-based targeting is affected by the ease with which subscribers can change operators \u2014 and by extension change their MSISDN \u2014 through a simple profile switch. A target who suspects surveillance may switch to a different profile and MSISDN without a physical SIM changing hands. Similar switches have always been possible with dual-SIM phones. Each new profile still means a new subscription (in Germany, prepaid profiles require an identity check before activation, \u00a7 172(2) TKG), and its download is logged against the device’s EID. The operator that was performing the interception may lose visibility of the target entirely if the target activates a profile from a different operator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le ciblage bas\u00e9 sur l'IMSI se heurte \u00e0 des difficult\u00e9s similaires. Chaque profil d'op\u00e9rateur sur l'eUICC poss\u00e8de son propre IMSI. Lorsque la cible change de profil, un autre IMSI devient actif, et l'IMSI d'origine n'est plus visible sur le r\u00e9seau. L'op\u00e9rateur qui effectue l'interception en se basant sur l'IMSI d'origine verra la cible dispara\u00eetre, en apparence, du r\u00e9seau.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IMEI-based targeting is more stable in the eSIM context, as the IMEI is associated with the device rather than the SIM profile. Note that dual-SIM and multi-profile devices carry a separate IMEI for each simultaneously active subscription, and that the network usually learns the IMEI only at registration. However, IMEI-based interception has its own limitations \u2014 it may capture communications from other users who share the device, and it does not help if the target uses multiple devices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le ciblage bas\u00e9 sur l'adresse IP est, par nature, dynamique et n'est pas sp\u00e9cifiquement affect\u00e9 par l'eSIM ; toutefois, la complexit\u00e9 globale du ciblage dans un environnement eSIM peut amener les forces de l'ordre \u00e0 s'appuyer davantage sur l'identification par adresse IP, ce qui pose ses propres d\u00e9fis li\u00e9s \u00e0 l'attribution dynamique et \u00e0 la traduction d'adresses r\u00e9seau.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Changement de profil et continuit\u00e9 de l'interception<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

One of the most significant challenges that eSIM creates for lawful interception is the potential for interception discontinuity during profile switches. When a target switches from one operator profile to another on the same device, the interception that was active on the first operator’s network must be coordinated with a new interception on the second operator’s network. In practice, law enforcement must identify the new operator, obtain a new order and serve it there, which may take hours or days, during which the target’s communications go unmonitored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The speed and ease of profile switching in the eSIM model \u2014 which can be accomplished in seconds on many devices \u2014 contrasts sharply with the time required to establish a new interception on a different operator’s network. This temporal gap is an investigative challenge for law enforcement rather than a compliance gap for the original operator, whose obligation ends at its own subscription and the identifiers named in the order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Addressing this challenge requires enhanced coordination mechanisms between operators and law enforcement, potentially including automated notifications when a target’s profile is deactivated and standardised procedures for rapidly establishing interceptions on the target’s new operator. Standardised solutions are not yet widely available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sc\u00e9narios multi-profils et multi-appareils<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

La technologie eSIM permet des sc\u00e9narios difficiles \u00e0 g\u00e9rer avec les m\u00e9thodes d'interception traditionnelles. Un m\u00eame appareil peut h\u00e9berger plusieurs profils d'op\u00e9rateurs, provenant potentiellement d'op\u00e9rateurs de diff\u00e9rents pays. Un m\u00eame abonn\u00e9 peut disposer de profils eSIM sur plusieurs appareils : un smartphone, une tablette, une montre connect\u00e9e et un ordinateur portable. Chaque combinaison de profil et d'appareil cr\u00e9e un canal de communication potentiel susceptible de devoir \u00eatre intercept\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For operators, this means that the scope of an interception may extend beyond the traditional single-subscriber, single-device model. Within its own customer base, the operator should be able to tell law enforcement which other subscriptions or eSIM profiles the same customer holds, so that the order can be extended. It can intercept only the identifiers the order names.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pour les forces de l'ordre, le mod\u00e8le multiprofil signifie qu'un seul mandat d'interception peut ne pas suffire. Si la personne vis\u00e9e dispose de profils sur les r\u00e9seaux de plusieurs op\u00e9rateurs, il peut s'av\u00e9rer n\u00e9cessaire de d\u00e9livrer des mandats distincts \u00e0 chaque op\u00e9rateur. La coordination de ces multiples mandats \u2014 visant \u00e0 garantir une couverture compl\u00e8te sans lacunes \u2014 ajoute \u00e0 la complexit\u00e9 du processus d'enqu\u00eate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cons\u00e9quences pour le syst\u00e8me LI<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To maintain effective lawful interception in an eSIM environment, operators must ensure that their LI systems address several specific requirements. First, operators should understand what the network actually sees. Switching profiles happens locally on the device. The operator’s network sees it the way it sees a phone being switched off: the target’s subscription deregisters, and the existing interception reports this as IRI. The SM-DP+ is not a real-time LI source. Its value is in the records it keeps, such as which EID a profile was downloaded to, which can support disclosure requests. The LI system should not push target data to the SM-DP+, which is often operated by a third party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, the LI system must support the correlation of multiple identifiers associated with the same subscriber. A target may be known by different MSISDNs, IMSIs, and IP addresses depending on which profile is active. The LI system must maintain a mapping between these identifiers and the target’s interception order, ensuring that every identifier named in the order (MSISDN, IMSI\/SUPI, IMEI\/PEI) is intercepted, and that law enforcement can quickly learn which further identifiers the same customer uses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, the LI system should deliver the standard registration and deregistration events promptly, since a profile switch shows up on the network as the target’s subscription deregistering. This information can be valuable to law enforcement in understanding the target’s behavior and in deciding on follow-up orders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quatri\u00e8mement, l\u2019op\u00e9rateur\u2026 gestion des mandats<\/a> system must be capable of handling the additional complexity introduced by eSIM. This includes the ability to modify interception parameters when the order is amended, to report promptly when a target’s subscription goes inactive, so that law enforcement can decide on follow-up orders, and to keep a complete audit trail of every order amendment, identifier change and task activation or deactivation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00c9volutions en mati\u00e8re de r\u00e9glementation et de normes<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

LI standards address the issue indirectly: identifiers are always tied to the subscription or device, not to the SIM form factor. 3GPP’s 5G LI architecture (TS 33.127\/33.128) is SIM-agnostic: it intercepts by SUPI, PEI and GPSI, whether the credentials sit on a physical SIM or an eSIM profile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

National LI rules<\/a> generally do not treat eSIM separately. In Germany, the TK\u00dcV and TR TK\u00dcV are technology-neutral: interception is tied to identifiers such as MSISDN, IMSI\/SUPI and IMEI\/PEI, so it applies to eSIM subscriptions exactly as to physical SIMs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

eSIM technology and the RSP architecture introduce significant new challenges for lawful interception, primarily related to target identification, interception continuity, and multi-profile scenarios. These challenges are not insurmountable, but they require operators to report registration events promptly, keep reliable records linking EID, ICCID and IMSI, and answer subscriber-data requests quickly. eSIM does not change an operator\u2019s LI obligations; it changes how quickly law enforcement needs to learn about a target\u2019s other subscriptions.<\/p>\n\n\n

Mesures pratiques \u00e0 l'intention des exploitants<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Operators should begin by assessing their current eSIM deployment and its impact on their existing LI capabilities. This assessment should identify any gaps in target identification, interception continuity, or multi-profile handling. Based on the assessment, operators should develop a roadmap for enhancing their LI systems to address eSIM-specific challenges, prioritising the highest-risk gaps first. Prompt delivery of registration and deregistration events, and the ability to answer subscriber-data requests from the operator’s own EID, ICCID and IMSI records, are the foundation for supporting law enforcement in an eSIM environment. Operators should also engage with their national regulatory authority to understand any specific guidance or requirements related to eSIM and LI compliance, and should participate in industry forums and standards development activities to help shape the emerging solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00c0 mesure que l'adoption de l'eSIM s'acc\u00e9l\u00e8re, les d\u00e9fis li\u00e9s \u00e0 l'interception l\u00e9gale des donn\u00e9es sur l'eSIM deviendront de plus en plus pressants. Les op\u00e9rateurs devraient int\u00e9grer de mani\u00e8re proactive les exigences en mati\u00e8re d'interception l\u00e9gale des donn\u00e9es sur l'eSIM dans leurs plans de mise en conformit\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Articles connexes<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

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