{"id":2164,"date":"2026-07-22T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-07-22T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ic-services.io\/?p=2164"},"modified":"2026-10-21T14:13:28","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T13:13:28","slug":"por-exemplo-intercecao-legal-rsp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ic-services.io\/pt\/resources\/blog\/esim-lawful-interception-rsp\/","title":{"rendered":"eSIM e interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal: O que a arquitetura RSP significa para a conformidade"},"content":{"rendered":"

A interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal do eSIM apresenta desafios t\u00e9cnicos \u00fanicos em compara\u00e7\u00e3o com a interce\u00e7\u00e3o tradicional baseada em cart\u00f5es SIM. A transi\u00e7\u00e3o dos cart\u00f5es SIM f\u00edsicos para a tecnologia de SIM incorporado (eSIM) est\u00e1 a remodelar o panorama das telecomunica\u00e7\u00f5es m\u00f3veis. Impulsionado pela arquitetura de Aprovisionamento Remoto de SIM (RSP) da GSMA, o eSIM permite aos assinantes mudar de operador, ativar perfis e gerir v\u00e1rias subscri\u00e7\u00f5es sem terem de substituir fisicamente um cart\u00e3o SIM. Para os consumidores, isto significa maior flexibilidade e comodidade. Para os operadores \u2014 e, em particular, para os respons\u00e1veis por conformidade com a interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal<\/a> \u2014 O eSIM introduz novas complexidades que t\u00eam de ser compreendidas e resolvidas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Este artigo analisa a forma como a arquitetura RSP afeta a interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal, identifica os desafios espec\u00edficos que o eSIM coloca \u00e0 identifica\u00e7\u00e3o de alvos e \u00e0 gest\u00e3o da interce\u00e7\u00e3o e fornece orienta\u00e7\u00f5es pr\u00e1ticas para as operadoras que pretendem manter a conformidade num ambiente compat\u00edvel com o eSIM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Como funciona a interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal do eSIM<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The GSMA RSP architecture defines the ecosystem for managing eSIM profiles. The key components include the Subscription Manager \u2014 Data Preparation (SM-DP+), which prepares and securely delivers operator profiles to eSIM devices; the Subscription Manager \u2014 Discovery Server (SM-DS), which facilitates the discovery of available profiles; the eUICC (embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which is the secure element within the device that hosts one or more operator profiles; and the Local Profile Assistant (LPA), which is the software on the device that manages profile download, installation, and switching. For IoT devices, GSMA SGP.31\/SGP.32 replaces the user-driven LPA with a remote eSIM IoT Manager (eIM).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the RSP model, an operator’s profile \u2014 containing the IMSI, authentication credentials, network access configuration, and other parameters \u2014 is downloaded and installed onto the eUICC remotely. Multiple profiles can coexist on a single eUICC. Older eUICCs allow only one enabled profile at a time; since GSMA SGP.22 v3, devices supporting Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP) can run two at once. Subscribers can switch between profiles \u2014 and effectively between operators \u2014 through a software operation on the device, without any physical intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This dynamic, software-driven provisioning model is fundamentally different from the traditional physical SIM model, where the IMSI is personalised onto a card that has to be physically delivered. The implications for lawful interception are significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Desafios na identifica\u00e7\u00e3o de alvos<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As ordens de interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal identificam normalmente o alvo atrav\u00e9s de um ou mais identificadores: MSISDN (n\u00famero de telefone), IMSI (identidade do assinante), IMEI (identidade do dispositivo) ou endere\u00e7o IP. O modelo eSIM complica cada um destes m\u00e9todos de identifica\u00e7\u00e3o de formas diferentes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

MSISDN-based targeting is affected by the ease with which subscribers can change operators \u2014 and by extension change their MSISDN \u2014 through a simple profile switch. A target who suspects surveillance may switch to a different profile and MSISDN without a physical SIM changing hands. Similar switches have always been possible with dual-SIM phones. Each new profile still means a new subscription (in Germany, prepaid profiles require an identity check before activation, \u00a7 172(2) TKG), and its download is logged against the device’s EID. The operator that was performing the interception may lose visibility of the target entirely if the target activates a profile from a different operator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A localiza\u00e7\u00e3o com base no IMSI enfrenta desafios semelhantes. Cada perfil de operador no eUICC tem o seu pr\u00f3prio IMSI. Quando o alvo muda de perfil, um IMSI diferente torna-se ativo e o IMSI original deixa de estar vis\u00edvel na rede. O operador que estiver a interceptar com base no IMSI original ver\u00e1 o alvo aparentemente desaparecer da rede.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IMEI-based targeting is more stable in the eSIM context, as the IMEI is associated with the device rather than the SIM profile. Note that dual-SIM and multi-profile devices carry a separate IMEI for each simultaneously active subscription, and that the network usually learns the IMEI only at registration. However, IMEI-based interception has its own limitations \u2014 it may capture communications from other users who share the device, and it does not help if the target uses multiple devices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A segmenta\u00e7\u00e3o baseada no endere\u00e7o IP \u00e9, por natureza, din\u00e2mica e n\u00e3o \u00e9 especificamente afetada pelo eSIM; no entanto, a complexidade geral da segmenta\u00e7\u00e3o num ambiente eSIM pode levar as autoridades a recorrerem mais intensamente \u00e0 identifica\u00e7\u00e3o baseada no IP, o que acarreta os seus pr\u00f3prios desafios em termos de atribui\u00e7\u00e3o din\u00e2mica e tradu\u00e7\u00e3o de endere\u00e7os de rede.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Altern\u00e2ncia de perfis e continuidade da interce\u00e7\u00e3o<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

One of the most significant challenges that eSIM creates for lawful interception is the potential for interception discontinuity during profile switches. When a target switches from one operator profile to another on the same device, the interception that was active on the first operator’s network must be coordinated with a new interception on the second operator’s network. In practice, law enforcement must identify the new operator, obtain a new order and serve it there, which may take hours or days, during which the target’s communications go unmonitored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The speed and ease of profile switching in the eSIM model \u2014 which can be accomplished in seconds on many devices \u2014 contrasts sharply with the time required to establish a new interception on a different operator’s network. This temporal gap is an investigative challenge for law enforcement rather than a compliance gap for the original operator, whose obligation ends at its own subscription and the identifiers named in the order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Addressing this challenge requires enhanced coordination mechanisms between operators and law enforcement, potentially including automated notifications when a target’s profile is deactivated and standardised procedures for rapidly establishing interceptions on the target’s new operator. Standardised solutions are not yet widely available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cen\u00e1rios com v\u00e1rios perfis e v\u00e1rios dispositivos<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A tecnologia eSIM permite cen\u00e1rios que s\u00e3o dif\u00edceis de abordar com as abordagens tradicionais de interce\u00e7\u00e3o. Um \u00fanico dispositivo pode albergar v\u00e1rios perfis de operadores, potencialmente de operadores de diferentes pa\u00edses. Um \u00fanico assinante pode ter perfis eSIM em v\u00e1rios dispositivos \u2014 um smartphone, um tablet, um rel\u00f3gio inteligente e um computador port\u00e1til. Cada combina\u00e7\u00e3o de perfil e dispositivo cria um potencial canal de comunica\u00e7\u00e3o que poder\u00e1 ter de ser interceptado.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For operators, this means that the scope of an interception may extend beyond the traditional single-subscriber, single-device model. Within its own customer base, the operator should be able to tell law enforcement which other subscriptions or eSIM profiles the same customer holds, so that the order can be extended. It can intercept only the identifiers the order names.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No que diz respeito \u00e0s autoridades respons\u00e1veis pela aplica\u00e7\u00e3o da lei, o modelo multiprofilado significa que uma \u00fanica ordem de interce\u00e7\u00e3o pode n\u00e3o ser suficiente. Se o alvo tiver perfis nas redes de v\u00e1rios operadores, poder\u00e1 ser necess\u00e1rio emitir ordens separadas para cada operador. A coordena\u00e7\u00e3o destas m\u00faltiplas ordens \u2014 garantindo uma cobertura completa sem lacunas \u2014 aumenta a complexidade do processo de investiga\u00e7\u00e3o.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implica\u00e7\u00f5es para o Sistema LI<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To maintain effective lawful interception in an eSIM environment, operators must ensure that their LI systems address several specific requirements. First, operators should understand what the network actually sees. Switching profiles happens locally on the device. The operator’s network sees it the way it sees a phone being switched off: the target’s subscription deregisters, and the existing interception reports this as IRI. The SM-DP+ is not a real-time LI source. Its value is in the records it keeps, such as which EID a profile was downloaded to, which can support disclosure requests. The LI system should not push target data to the SM-DP+, which is often operated by a third party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, the LI system must support the correlation of multiple identifiers associated with the same subscriber. A target may be known by different MSISDNs, IMSIs, and IP addresses depending on which profile is active. The LI system must maintain a mapping between these identifiers and the target’s interception order, ensuring that every identifier named in the order (MSISDN, IMSI\/SUPI, IMEI\/PEI) is intercepted, and that law enforcement can quickly learn which further identifiers the same customer uses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, the LI system should deliver the standard registration and deregistration events promptly, since a profile switch shows up on the network as the target’s subscription deregistering. This information can be valuable to law enforcement in understanding the target’s behavior and in deciding on follow-up orders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Em quarto lugar, o operador gest\u00e3o de mandados<\/a> system must be capable of handling the additional complexity introduced by eSIM. This includes the ability to modify interception parameters when the order is amended, to report promptly when a target’s subscription goes inactive, so that law enforcement can decide on follow-up orders, and to keep a complete audit trail of every order amendment, identifier change and task activation or deactivation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Evolu\u00e7\u00e3o da regulamenta\u00e7\u00e3o e das normas<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

LI standards address the issue indirectly: identifiers are always tied to the subscription or device, not to the SIM form factor. 3GPP’s 5G LI architecture (TS 33.127\/33.128) is SIM-agnostic: it intercepts by SUPI, PEI and GPSI, whether the credentials sit on a physical SIM or an eSIM profile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

National LI rules<\/a> generally do not treat eSIM separately. In Germany, the TK\u00dcV and TR TK\u00dcV are technology-neutral: interception is tied to identifiers such as MSISDN, IMSI\/SUPI and IMEI\/PEI, so it applies to eSIM subscriptions exactly as to physical SIMs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclus\u00e3o<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

eSIM technology and the RSP architecture introduce significant new challenges for lawful interception, primarily related to target identification, interception continuity, and multi-profile scenarios. These challenges are not insurmountable, but they require operators to report registration events promptly, keep reliable records linking EID, ICCID and IMSI, and answer subscriber-data requests quickly. eSIM does not change an operator\u2019s LI obligations; it changes how quickly law enforcement needs to learn about a target\u2019s other subscriptions.<\/p>\n\n\n

Medidas pr\u00e1ticas para os operadores<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Operators should begin by assessing their current eSIM deployment and its impact on their existing LI capabilities. This assessment should identify any gaps in target identification, interception continuity, or multi-profile handling. Based on the assessment, operators should develop a roadmap for enhancing their LI systems to address eSIM-specific challenges, prioritising the highest-risk gaps first. Prompt delivery of registration and deregistration events, and the ability to answer subscriber-data requests from the operator’s own EID, ICCID and IMSI records, are the foundation for supporting law enforcement in an eSIM environment. Operators should also engage with their national regulatory authority to understand any specific guidance or requirements related to eSIM and LI compliance, and should participate in industry forums and standards development activities to help shape the emerging solutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00c0 medida que a ado\u00e7\u00e3o do eSIM se acelera, os desafios relacionados com a interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal do eSIM tornar-se-\u00e3o mais prementes. As operadoras devem abordar de forma proativa os requisitos de interce\u00e7\u00e3o legal do eSIM nos seus planos de conformidade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Artigos relacionados<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Para mais informa\u00e7\u00f5es sobre temas relacionados, consulte estes artigos:<\/p>\n\n\n\n