eSIMを用いた合法的な通信傍受は、従来のSIMカードベースの傍受と比較して、特有の技術的課題を伴います。物理的なSIMカードから組み込み型SIM（eSIM）技術への移行は、モバイル通信のあり方を一変させつつあります。 GSMAの「リモートSIMプロビジョニング（RSP）」アーキテクチャを基盤とするeSIMにより、加入者はSIMカードを物理的に交換することなく、通信事業者の切り替え、プロファイルの有効化、複数の契約の管理が可能になります。消費者にとっては、これにより柔軟性と利便性が向上します。通信事業者、とりわけ以下の責任を担う者にとっては、 合法的な通信傍受に関するコンプライアンス — eSIMの導入により、理解し、対処しなければならない新たな課題が生じている。.
本記事では、RSPアーキテクチャが合法的な通信傍受にどのような影響を与えるかを検証し、eSIMが対象の特定や傍受管理にもたらす具体的な課題を明らかにするとともに、eSIM対応環境においてコンプライアンスを維持しようとする通信事業者に向けた実践的な指針を示す。.
eSIMによる合法的な通信傍受の仕組み
The GSMA RSP architecture defines the ecosystem for managing eSIM profiles. The key components include the Subscription Manager — Data Preparation (SM-DP+), which prepares and securely delivers operator profiles to eSIM devices; the Subscription Manager — Discovery Server (SM-DS), which facilitates the discovery of available profiles; the eUICC (embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which is the secure element within the device that hosts one or more operator profiles; and the Local Profile Assistant (LPA), which is the software on the device that manages profile download, installation, and switching. For IoT devices, GSMA SGP.31/SGP.32 replaces the user-driven LPA with a remote eSIM IoT Manager (eIM).
Under the RSP model, an operator’s profile — containing the IMSI, authentication credentials, network access configuration, and other parameters — is downloaded and installed onto the eUICC remotely. Multiple profiles can coexist on a single eUICC. Older eUICCs allow only one enabled profile at a time; since GSMA SGP.22 v3, devices supporting Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP) can run two at once. Subscribers can switch between profiles — and effectively between operators — through a software operation on the device, without any physical intervention.
This dynamic, software-driven provisioning model is fundamentally different from the traditional physical SIM model, where the IMSI is personalised onto a card that has to be physically delivered. The implications for lawful interception are significant.
標的の特定における課題
合法的な傍受命令では、通常、MSISDN（電話番号）、IMSI（加入者識別番号）、IMEI（端末識別番号）、またはIPアドレスといった1つ以上の識別子を用いて対象を特定します。eSIMモデルは、これらの識別方法のそれぞれを異なる形で複雑化させています。.
MSISDN-based targeting is affected by the ease with which subscribers can change operators — and by extension change their MSISDN — through a simple profile switch. A target who suspects surveillance may switch to a different profile and MSISDN without a physical SIM changing hands. Similar switches have always been possible with dual-SIM phones. Each new profile still means a new subscription (in Germany, prepaid profiles require an identity check before activation, § 172(2) TKG), and its download is logged against the device’s EID. The operator that was performing the interception may lose visibility of the target entirely if the target activates a profile from a different operator.
IMSI に基づく標的特定にも同様の課題があります。eUICC 上の各通信事業者のプロファイルには、それぞれ固有の IMSI が割り当てられています。標的がプロファイルを切り替えると、別の IMSI がアクティブになり、元の IMSI はネットワーク上で確認できなくなります。元の IMSI に基づいて通信を傍受していた通信事業者は、標的がネットワーク上から消えたかのように見えることになります。.
IMEI-based targeting is more stable in the eSIM context, as the IMEI is associated with the device rather than the SIM profile. Note that dual-SIM and multi-profile devices carry a separate IMEI for each simultaneously active subscription, and that the network usually learns the IMEI only at registration. However, IMEI-based interception has its own limitations — it may capture communications from other users who share the device, and it does not help if the target uses multiple devices.
IPアドレスに基づくターゲティングは本質的に動的なものであり、eSIMによって特に影響を受けるわけではありませんが、eSIM環境におけるターゲティングの全体的な複雑さにより、法執行機関はIPアドレスに基づく識別により大きく依存するようになる可能性があります。ただし、これには動的な割り当てやネットワークアドレス変換といった固有の課題も伴います。.
プロファイルの切り替えとインターセプトの継続性
One of the most significant challenges that eSIM creates for lawful interception is the potential for interception discontinuity during profile switches. When a target switches from one operator profile to another on the same device, the interception that was active on the first operator’s network must be coordinated with a new interception on the second operator’s network. In practice, law enforcement must identify the new operator, obtain a new order and serve it there, which may take hours or days, during which the target’s communications go unmonitored.
The speed and ease of profile switching in the eSIM model — which can be accomplished in seconds on many devices — contrasts sharply with the time required to establish a new interception on a different operator’s network. This temporal gap is an investigative challenge for law enforcement rather than a compliance gap for the original operator, whose obligation ends at its own subscription and the identifiers named in the order.
Addressing this challenge requires enhanced coordination mechanisms between operators and law enforcement, potentially including automated notifications when a target’s profile is deactivated and standardised procedures for rapidly establishing interceptions on the target’s new operator. Standardised solutions are not yet widely available.
マルチプロファイルおよびマルチデバイス環境
eSIM技術により、従来の傍受手法では対応が困難なシナリオが可能になります。 1台の端末に、異なる国の通信事業者による複数のプロファイルが登録されている可能性があります。また、1人の加入者が、スマートフォン、タブレット、スマートウォッチ、ノートパソコンなど、複数の端末にeSIMプロファイルを保有している場合もあります。プロファイルと端末のそれぞれの組み合わせが、傍受の対象となり得る通信チャネルを生み出すことになります。.
For operators, this means that the scope of an interception may extend beyond the traditional single-subscriber, single-device model. Within its own customer base, the operator should be able to tell law enforcement which other subscriptions or eSIM profiles the same customer holds, so that the order can be extended. It can intercept only the identifiers the order names.
法執行機関にとって、マルチプロファイルモデルとは、単一の通信傍受命令だけでは不十分な場合があることを意味します。対象者が複数の通信事業者のネットワーク上にプロファイルを持っている場合、各通信事業者に対して個別に命令を発令する必要があるかもしれません。これらの複数の命令を調整し、抜けのない完全な網羅性を確保することは、捜査プロセスを複雑なものにします。.
LIシステムへの影響
To maintain effective lawful interception in an eSIM environment, operators must ensure that their LI systems address several specific requirements. First, operators should understand what the network actually sees. Switching profiles happens locally on the device. The operator’s network sees it the way it sees a phone being switched off: the target’s subscription deregisters, and the existing interception reports this as IRI. The SM-DP+ is not a real-time LI source. Its value is in the records it keeps, such as which EID a profile was downloaded to, which can support disclosure requests. The LI system should not push target data to the SM-DP+, which is often operated by a third party.
Second, the LI system must support the correlation of multiple identifiers associated with the same subscriber. A target may be known by different MSISDNs, IMSIs, and IP addresses depending on which profile is active. The LI system must maintain a mapping between these identifiers and the target’s interception order, ensuring that every identifier named in the order (MSISDN, IMSI/SUPI, IMEI/PEI) is intercepted, and that law enforcement can quickly learn which further identifiers the same customer uses.
Third, the LI system should deliver the standard registration and deregistration events promptly, since a profile switch shows up on the network as the target’s subscription deregistering. This information can be valuable to law enforcement in understanding the target’s behavior and in deciding on follow-up orders.
第四に、事業者の 令状管理 system must be capable of handling the additional complexity introduced by eSIM. This includes the ability to modify interception parameters when the order is amended, to report promptly when a target’s subscription goes inactive, so that law enforcement can decide on follow-up orders, and to keep a complete audit trail of every order amendment, identifier change and task activation or deactivation.
規制および規格の動向
LI standards address the issue indirectly: identifiers are always tied to the subscription or device, not to the SIM form factor. 3GPP’s 5G LI architecture (TS 33.127/33.128) is SIM-agnostic: it intercepts by SUPI, PEI and GPSI, whether the credentials sit on a physical SIM or an eSIM profile.
National LI rules generally do not treat eSIM separately. In Germany, the TKÜV and TR TKÜV are technology-neutral: interception is tied to identifiers such as MSISDN, IMSI/SUPI and IMEI/PEI, so it applies to eSIM subscriptions exactly as to physical SIMs.
結論
eSIM technology and the RSP architecture introduce significant new challenges for lawful interception, primarily related to target identification, interception continuity, and multi-profile scenarios. These challenges are not insurmountable, but they require operators to report registration events promptly, keep reliable records linking EID, ICCID and IMSI, and answer subscriber-data requests quickly. eSIM does not change an operator’s LI obligations; it changes how quickly law enforcement needs to learn about a target’s other subscriptions.
事業者向けの実践的な手順
Operators should begin by assessing their current eSIM deployment and its impact on their existing LI capabilities. This assessment should identify any gaps in target identification, interception continuity, or multi-profile handling. Based on the assessment, operators should develop a roadmap for enhancing their LI systems to address eSIM-specific challenges, prioritising the highest-risk gaps first. Prompt delivery of registration and deregistration events, and the ability to answer subscriber-data requests from the operator’s own EID, ICCID and IMSI records, are the foundation for supporting law enforcement in an eSIM environment. Operators should also engage with their national regulatory authority to understand any specific guidance or requirements related to eSIM and LI compliance, and should participate in industry forums and standards development activities to help shape the emerging solutions.
eSIMの普及が加速するにつれ、eSIMの合法的傍受に関する課題はますます差し迫ったものとなるでしょう。通信事業者は、コンプライアンスのロードマップにおいて、eSIMの合法的傍受に関する要件に積極的に取り組む必要があります。.
関連記事
関連トピックについては、以下の記事を参照されたい：
- eSIM専用MVNOにおけるLI：特有の課題と実践的な解決策
- MVNOとMNO：合法的傍受の法的責任はどちらにあるのか？
- 5G SAにおけるネットワークスライシング：LIターゲティングをいかに複雑にするか（そしていかに簡素化できるか）
外部リソース
以下の外部リソースは、さらなる背景と公式文書を提供している：
