La interceptación legal de las eSIM plantea retos técnicos únicos en comparación con la interceptación tradicional basada en tarjetas SIM. La transición de las tarjetas SIM físicas a la tecnología de SIM integrada (eSIM) está transformando el panorama de las telecomunicaciones móviles. Impulsada por la arquitectura de aprovisionamiento remoto de SIM (RSP) de la GSMA, la eSIM permite a los abonados cambiar de operador, activar perfiles y gestionar múltiples suscripciones sin necesidad de sustituir físicamente una tarjeta SIM. Para los consumidores, esto supone una mayor flexibilidad y comodidad. Para los operadores —y, en particular, para los responsables de cumplimiento de la normativa sobre interceptación legal — La eSIM plantea nuevas complejidades que hay que comprender y abordar.
Este artículo analiza cómo la arquitectura RSP afecta a la interceptación legal, identifica los retos específicos que plantea la eSIM para la identificación de objetivos y la gestión de la interceptación, y ofrece orientación práctica a los operadores que deseen mantener el cumplimiento normativo en un entorno compatible con la eSIM.
Cómo funciona la interceptación legal de la eSIM
The GSMA RSP architecture defines the ecosystem for managing eSIM profiles. The key components include the Subscription Manager — Data Preparation (SM-DP+), which prepares and securely delivers operator profiles to eSIM devices; the Subscription Manager — Discovery Server (SM-DS), which facilitates the discovery of available profiles; the eUICC (embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which is the secure element within the device that hosts one or more operator profiles; and the Local Profile Assistant (LPA), which is the software on the device that manages profile download, installation, and switching. For IoT devices, GSMA SGP.31/SGP.32 replaces the user-driven LPA with a remote eSIM IoT Manager (eIM).
Under the RSP model, an operator’s profile — containing the IMSI, authentication credentials, network access configuration, and other parameters — is downloaded and installed onto the eUICC remotely. Multiple profiles can coexist on a single eUICC. Older eUICCs allow only one enabled profile at a time; since GSMA SGP.22 v3, devices supporting Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP) can run two at once. Subscribers can switch between profiles — and effectively between operators — through a software operation on the device, without any physical intervention.
This dynamic, software-driven provisioning model is fundamentally different from the traditional physical SIM model, where the IMSI is personalised onto a card that has to be physically delivered. The implications for lawful interception are significant.
Retos en la identificación de objetivos
Las órdenes de interceptación legal suelen identificar al destinatario mediante uno o varios identificadores: MSISDN (número de teléfono), IMSI (identidad del abonado), IMEI (identidad del dispositivo) o dirección IP. El modelo eSIM complica cada uno de estos métodos de identificación de diferentes maneras.
MSISDN-based targeting is affected by the ease with which subscribers can change operators — and by extension change their MSISDN — through a simple profile switch. A target who suspects surveillance may switch to a different profile and MSISDN without a physical SIM changing hands. Similar switches have always been possible with dual-SIM phones. Each new profile still means a new subscription (in Germany, prepaid profiles require an identity check before activation, § 172(2) TKG), and its download is logged against the device’s EID. The operator that was performing the interception may lose visibility of the target entirely if the target activates a profile from a different operator.
La localización basada en el IMSI se enfrenta a retos similares. Cada perfil de operador de la eUICC tiene su propio IMSI. Cuando el usuario cambia de perfil, se activa un IMSI diferente y el IMSI original deja de ser visible en la red. El operador que esté realizando la interceptación basándose en el IMSI original verá cómo el usuario parece desaparecer de la red.
IMEI-based targeting is more stable in the eSIM context, as the IMEI is associated with the device rather than the SIM profile. Note that dual-SIM and multi-profile devices carry a separate IMEI for each simultaneously active subscription, and that the network usually learns the IMEI only at registration. However, IMEI-based interception has its own limitations — it may capture communications from other users who share the device, and it does not help if the target uses multiple devices.
La segmentación basada en direcciones IP es, por naturaleza, dinámica y no se ve afectada específicamente por la eSIM; sin embargo, la complejidad general de la segmentación en un entorno de eSIM puede llevar a las fuerzas del orden a recurrir en mayor medida a la identificación basada en direcciones IP, lo que plantea sus propios retos en cuanto a la asignación dinámica y la traducción de direcciones de red.
Cambio de perfil y continuidad de la interceptación
One of the most significant challenges that eSIM creates for lawful interception is the potential for interception discontinuity during profile switches. When a target switches from one operator profile to another on the same device, the interception that was active on the first operator’s network must be coordinated with a new interception on the second operator’s network. In practice, law enforcement must identify the new operator, obtain a new order and serve it there, which may take hours or days, during which the target’s communications go unmonitored.
The speed and ease of profile switching in the eSIM model — which can be accomplished in seconds on many devices — contrasts sharply with the time required to establish a new interception on a different operator’s network. This temporal gap is an investigative challenge for law enforcement rather than a compliance gap for the original operator, whose obligation ends at its own subscription and the identifiers named in the order.
Addressing this challenge requires enhanced coordination mechanisms between operators and law enforcement, potentially including automated notifications when a target’s profile is deactivated and standardised procedures for rapidly establishing interceptions on the target’s new operator. Standardised solutions are not yet widely available.
Escenarios con múltiples perfiles y dispositivos
La tecnología eSIM permite situaciones que resultan difíciles de abordar con los métodos de interceptación tradicionales. Un mismo dispositivo puede albergar varios perfiles de operador, potencialmente de operadores de diferentes países. Un mismo abonado puede tener perfiles de eSIM en varios dispositivos: un smartphone, una tableta, un reloj inteligente y un ordenador portátil. Cada combinación de perfil y dispositivo crea un canal de comunicación potencial que podría ser necesario interceptar.
For operators, this means that the scope of an interception may extend beyond the traditional single-subscriber, single-device model. Within its own customer base, the operator should be able to tell law enforcement which other subscriptions or eSIM profiles the same customer holds, so that the order can be extended. It can intercept only the identifiers the order names.
Para las fuerzas del orden, el modelo de perfiles múltiples implica que una única orden de interceptación puede no ser suficiente. Si el sujeto de la investigación tiene perfiles en las redes de varios operadores, puede ser necesario emitir órdenes separadas para cada operador. La coordinación de estas múltiples órdenes —garantizando una cobertura completa sin lagunas— añade complejidad al proceso de investigación.
Repercusiones para el sistema LI
To maintain effective lawful interception in an eSIM environment, operators must ensure that their LI systems address several specific requirements. First, operators should understand what the network actually sees. Switching profiles happens locally on the device. The operator’s network sees it the way it sees a phone being switched off: the target’s subscription deregisters, and the existing interception reports this as IRI. The SM-DP+ is not a real-time LI source. Its value is in the records it keeps, such as which EID a profile was downloaded to, which can support disclosure requests. The LI system should not push target data to the SM-DP+, which is often operated by a third party.
Second, the LI system must support the correlation of multiple identifiers associated with the same subscriber. A target may be known by different MSISDNs, IMSIs, and IP addresses depending on which profile is active. The LI system must maintain a mapping between these identifiers and the target’s interception order, ensuring that every identifier named in the order (MSISDN, IMSI/SUPI, IMEI/PEI) is intercepted, and that law enforcement can quickly learn which further identifiers the same customer uses.
Third, the LI system should deliver the standard registration and deregistration events promptly, since a profile switch shows up on the network as the target’s subscription deregistering. This information can be valuable to law enforcement in understanding the target’s behavior and in deciding on follow-up orders.
En cuarto lugar, el operador… gestión de órdenes de detención system must be capable of handling the additional complexity introduced by eSIM. This includes the ability to modify interception parameters when the order is amended, to report promptly when a target’s subscription goes inactive, so that law enforcement can decide on follow-up orders, and to keep a complete audit trail of every order amendment, identifier change and task activation or deactivation.
Evolución de la normativa y las normas
LI standards address the issue indirectly: identifiers are always tied to the subscription or device, not to the SIM form factor. 3GPP’s 5G LI architecture (TS 33.127/33.128) is SIM-agnostic: it intercepts by SUPI, PEI and GPSI, whether the credentials sit on a physical SIM or an eSIM profile.
National LI rules generally do not treat eSIM separately. In Germany, the TKÜV and TR TKÜV are technology-neutral: interception is tied to identifiers such as MSISDN, IMSI/SUPI and IMEI/PEI, so it applies to eSIM subscriptions exactly as to physical SIMs.
Conclusión
eSIM technology and the RSP architecture introduce significant new challenges for lawful interception, primarily related to target identification, interception continuity, and multi-profile scenarios. These challenges are not insurmountable, but they require operators to report registration events promptly, keep reliable records linking EID, ICCID and IMSI, and answer subscriber-data requests quickly. eSIM does not change an operator’s LI obligations; it changes how quickly law enforcement needs to learn about a target’s other subscriptions.
Medidas prácticas para los operadores
Operators should begin by assessing their current eSIM deployment and its impact on their existing LI capabilities. This assessment should identify any gaps in target identification, interception continuity, or multi-profile handling. Based on the assessment, operators should develop a roadmap for enhancing their LI systems to address eSIM-specific challenges, prioritising the highest-risk gaps first. Prompt delivery of registration and deregistration events, and the ability to answer subscriber-data requests from the operator’s own EID, ICCID and IMSI records, are the foundation for supporting law enforcement in an eSIM environment. Operators should also engage with their national regulatory authority to understand any specific guidance or requirements related to eSIM and LI compliance, and should participate in industry forums and standards development activities to help shape the emerging solutions.
A medida que se acelera la adopción de las eSIM, los retos relacionados con la interceptación legal de las eSIM cobrarán mayor relevancia. Los operadores deberían abordar de forma proactiva los requisitos de interceptación legal de las eSIM en sus planes de cumplimiento normativo.
Artículos relacionados
Si desea leer más sobre temas relacionados, consulte estos artículos:
- LI para operadores móviles virtuales (OMV) que solo ofrecen eSIM: retos específicos y soluciones prácticas
- OMV vs. OMR: ¿Quién es legalmente responsable de la interceptación legal?
- El «network slicing» en 5G SA: cómo complica (y puede simplificar) la selección de objetivos de LI
Recursos externos
Los siguientes recursos externos proporcionan contexto adicional y documentación oficial:
